From: Hedley, Steve <S.Hedley@ucc.ie>
To: obligations@uwo.ca
Date: 06/08/2021 09:53:39
Subject: RE: Is a text message a signature?

As to signature, the core issue is whether a text can be seen unequivocally as representing what the sender wished to communicate. As it seems to me, we approach texts as bearing on their face the identity of the sender: in other words they are all signed, insofar as they need to be.

 

On one side of the argument, we can say that that is how we all view texts. (Did anyone doubt, for example, that the message which started this discussion came from Matt Harrington?  Did any other possibility even occur to you?)  It is true that if there was any doubt about the matter, it might turn on technical e-details that would have been inserted into the message by a machine, not by the sender. But in a case where there is no doubt and never has been any doubt, this shouldn’t matter. People send texts to tell people what they want to say: that is, indeed, what texts are for. For those with an aversion to too much instrumentalism, we can say that the signature required by the statute consists of clicking the “send” icon – as the sender well knows, it unequivocally marks the message as having come from the particular individual who sent it, which is all the courts have ever required of a “signature”.

 

On the other side of the argument, the emphasis is on side-issues. You might have lent your phone to someone else. There might be forgery. The message may not have been intended to affect legal rights. But all of these have their off-line analogues, and have not put off the courts before. Of course we have to construe the message to see if it had a serious legal intent. Of course a forged message does not bind the person it purports to be from. And of course we may sometimes have to examine questions of agency. But none of that detracts from the basic point about signature.  If the message purports to be from me and was in fact sent deliberately by me, then (as Prue says) the message itself is the authenticating mark. You don’t send texts to people merely to suggest that someone, somewhere in the world, wants to communicate the sentiment in the text.  You send them to state clearly that you do.

 

Interestingly, Andrew’s example of the headed notepaper came up in various old (19th / early 20th century) cases, and so far as I’m aware the courts always held that there was a sufficient signature – if I send a message on my headed notepaper, I am very clearly saying “This comes from me”, which is as good as a signature. But of course the modern argument is complicated by restatements of the old Statute of Frauds requirement – strictly speaking we need a separate discussion thread for each of the jurisdictions affected.

 

 

Steve Hedley

9thlevel.ie

private-law-theory.org

ssrn.com/author=32978

 

 

 

From: Barry Allan <barry.allan@otago.ac.nz>
Sent: Friday 6 August 2021 03:40
To: Andrew Tettenborn <a.m.tettenborn@swansea.ac.uk>; obligations@uwo.ca
Subject: Re: Is a text message a signature?

 

[EXTERNAL] This email was sent from outside of UCC.

This decision runs directly against earlier decisions involving emails and facsimiles. The Court in J Pereira Fernandes SA v Mehta [2006] EWHC 813 at [29] held that the information inserted into an email to identify the sender did not perform the function of indicating an intention to be bound. The New Zealand High Court came to the same conclusion in Welsh v Gatchell [2009] 1 NZLR 241 at [46] in respect of a sender's name printed automatically on a fax. On the logic of these cases, someone would have to deliberately include their name in the text to satisfy the objective behind the need for a signature.

 

I might be one of the few people around who has written specifically on this, in my article "The Validity of Informal Guarantees" http://www.nzlii.org/nz/journals/OtaLawRw/2013/3.html

 

Barry

 

University of Otago

Barry Allan | BA, BCOM, LLM
Associate Professor
Faculty of Law | Te Kaupeka Tātai ture
University of Otago | Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo


From: Andrew Tettenborn <a.m.tettenborn@swansea.ac.uk>
Sent: Friday, 6 August 2021 3:11 AM
To: Hedley, Steve <S.Hedley@ucc.ie>; obligations@uwo.ca <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: Re: Is a text message a signature?

 

I'm not so sure about this. It seems to me the requirement for signature means more than a requirement for a written document that we know beyond a peradventure that the obligor penned. The obligor must have done something extra to say, "This is me, and I wrote this."

Suppose I have a pad of pretty pink post-it notes with my name and phone number on them, given to me by a previous misguided girlfriend. On one of these I write a few words to you acknowledging the debt, but with nothing else at all on the note, and stick it to your car as I'm walking past. My own view is that that ought not to count as a signature (unlike the rather more complex rigmarole gone through by the man in Bassano v Toft) It seems to me a text message is difficult to distinguish from this.

But maybe I'm missing something, with a lockdown-addled brain.

 

Andrew

 

On 05/08/2021 15:18, Hedley, Steve wrote:

This seems to be part of a general trend of taking a broad view of "signature" in e-contexts so long as there is adequate evidence that the mark of assent was genuine - similar to Bassano v Toft [2014] EWHC 377 (QB) (paras 39-46) , where clicking on an "I Agree" button was also held to be a 'signature'. Wisely, the judges concerned define the principle in vague terms, in the hope that it will still apply even if the technology develops in unexpected directions (as no doubt it will). 

 


From: Matthew P. Harrington <matthew.p.harrington@umontreal.ca>
Sent: Thursday, August 5, 2021 2:12 PM
To: obligations@uwo.ca <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: Is a text message a signature?

 

For those who maintain casebooks or other course materials, there is a recent Ontario case (Divisional Court) on whether a text message can constitute a signature.  It arises in the context of a statute of limitations defence, but the principles seem applicable to contract or other contexts.  It’s a nice, short exposition of the problem and why a text should be considered a signature in certain cases (see paras 42-50).  The question of authenticity was solved not only by the fact that the text bore the telephone number of the sender, but also the “International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI) number” was also embedded in the data of text itself and provides a unique digital signature for every phone.

 

Might be interesting as a footnote or squib in student materials.  I know my students invariably ask about texts when we do statute of frauds.

 

The case is here:

 

https://www.ontariocondolaw.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/841/2021/07/2021onsc3477.pdf

 

Regards.

 

Harrington

--
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--

 

 

 

 



Andrew Tettenborn
Professor of Commercial Law, Swansea University

Institute for International Shipping and Trade Law
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Andrew Tettenborn
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ISTL

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